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Abstract
Since the Lipschitz properties of convolutional neural
network (CNN) are widely considered to be related
to adversarial robustness, we theoretically characterize
the `1 norm and `∞ norm of 2D multi-channel convo-
lutional layers and provide efficient methods to com-
pute the exact `1 norm and `∞ norm. Based on our
theorem, we propose a novel regularization method
termed norm decay, which can effectively reduce the
norms of CNN layers. Experiments show that norm-
regularization methods, including norm decay, weight
decay, and singular value clipping, can improve gen-
eralization of CNNs. However, we are surprised to
find that they can slightly hurt adversarial robustness.
Furthermore, we compute the norms of layers in the
CNNs trained with three different adversarial training
frameworks and find that adversarially robust CNNs
have comparable or even larger norms than their non-
adversarially robust counterparts. Moreover, we prove
that under a mild assumption, adversarially robust clas-
sifiers can be achieved with neural networks and an
adversarially robust neural network can have arbitrar-
ily large Lipschitz constant. For these reasons, enforc-
ing small norms of CNN layers may be neither effec-
tive nor necessary in achieving adversarial robustness.
Our code is available at https://github.com/
youweiliang/norm_robustness.
1. Introduction
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have enjoyed great
success in computer vision (LeCun et al., 2015; Goodfel-
low et al., 2016). However, many have found that CNNs
are vulnerable to adversarial attack (Akhtar & Mian, 2018;
Eykholt et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al., 2016; 2017). For example, changing one pixel in an
image can change the prediction of a CNN (Su et al., 2019).
Many authors link the vulnerability of CNNs to their Lips-
chitz properties and the common belief is that CNNs with
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small Lipschitz constants are more robust against adversar-
ial attack (Szegedy et al., 2014; Cisse et al., 2017; Bietti
et al., 2019; Anil et al., 2019; Virmaux & Scaman, 2018;
Fazlyab et al., 2019). Since computing the Lipschitz con-
stants of CNNs is intractable (Virmaux & Scaman, 2018),
existing approaches seek to regularize the norms of individ-
ual CNN layers. For example, Cisse et al. (2017) proposed
Parseval Network where the `2 norms of linear and convo-
lutional layers are constrained to be orthogonal. However,
from Table 1 in their paper, we can see Parseval Network
only slightly improves adversarial robustness in most cases
and even reduces robustness in some cases. Anil et al. (2019)
proposed combining GroupSort, a gradient norm preserving
activation function, with norm-constrained weight matrices
regularization to enforce Lipschitzness in fully-connected
networks while maintaining the expressive power of the
models. Li et al. (2019b) further extended GroupSort to
CNNs by proposing Block Convolution Orthogonal Param-
eterization (BCOP), which restricts the linear transforma-
tion matrix of a convolutional kernel to be orthogonal and
thus its `2 norm is bounded by 1. Again, we find that the
improvement is typically small and the standard accuracy
drops considerably. For example, we use the state-of-the-
art adversarial “Auto Attack” (Croce & Hein, 2020) to test
the checkpoint from the authors1 and find that, the robust
accuracy of their best model on CIFAR-10 is 8.4% (under
standard `∞ attack at  = 8/255), which is much smaller
than the state of the art ( 59.5%2) such as the methods of
(Carmon et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019; Pang et al., 2020),
while the standard accuracy drops to 72.2%. These issues
raise concerns over the effectiveness of regularization of
norms.
The approaches of regularization of norms are motivated
by the idea that reducing norms of individual layers can
reduce global Lipschitz constant and reducing global Lips-
chitz constant can ensure smaller local Lipschitz constants
and thus improve robustness. In this paper, we carefully
investigate the connections and distinctions between the
norms of layers, local Lipschitz constants, and global Lip-
schitz constants. And our findings, both theoretically and
empirically, do not support the prevailing idea that large
1https://github.com/ColinQiyangLi/
LConvNet
2https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack
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norms are bad for adversarial robustness.
Our contribution in this paper is summarized as follows.
• We theoretically characterize the `1 norm and `∞
norm of 2D multi-channel convolutional layers. Our
approaches are much faster than existing methods for
computing norms of convolutional layers and/or can
be applied to a wider range of convolutional layers.
• We propose a novel regularization method termed norm
decay, which can improve generalization of CNNs.
• We prove that robust classifiers can be realized with
neural networks under a mild assumption. Our theoret-
ical results and extensive experimental results suggest
that large norms of CNN layers do not hurt adversarial
robustness.
2. Related Work
Researches related to the norms of convolutional layers are
mostly concerned with the `2 norm. For example, Miyato
et al. (2018) reshape the 4D convolutional kernel into a 2D
matrix and use power iterations to compute the `2 norm of
the matrix. Although this method can improve the image
quality produced by WGAN (Arjovsky et al., 2017), the
norm of the reshaped kernel does not reflect the true norm
of the convolutional kernel. Based on the observation that
the result of power iterations can be computed through gradi-
ent back-propagation, Virmaux & Scaman (2018) proposed
AutoGrad to compute the `2 norm. Sedghi et al. (2019) the-
oretically analyzed the circular patterns in the unrolled con-
volutional kernel, based on which they discovered a new ap-
proach to compute the singular values of the kernels. Using
the computed spectrum of convolution, they proposed sin-
gular value clipping, a regularization method which projects
a convolution onto the set of convolutions with bounded `2
norm. It is worth noting that, because of the equivalence
of the matrix norms, i.e., 1/
√
m‖A‖1 ≤ ‖A‖2 ≤
√
n‖A‖1
and 1/
√
n‖A‖∞ ≤ ‖A‖2 ≤
√
m‖A‖∞ for all matrices
A ∈ Rm×n, our approaches to compute the `1 and `∞ norm
have the same functionalities as those to compute `2 norm,
while our approaches are much more efficient. Gouk et al.
(2018) give an analysis on the `1 and `∞ norm of convo-
lutional layers but they neglect the padding and strides of
convolution, and thus their method is unable to compute
the norms of most 2D multi-channel convolutional layers in
practice. Besides, their formulas for computing norms are
not backed by rigorous proof.
All these works have not yet given a clear analysis of how
the norms of neural net layers are related to adversarial
robustness. To bridge this gap, we first characterize the
norms of CNN layers and then analyze theoretically and test
empirically if large norms are bad for adversarial robustness.
3. The `1 and `∞ Norm of Convolutional
Layers
To understand how norms of CNN layers influence adver-
sarial robustness, we first need to characterize the norms.
Sedghi et al. (2019) proposed a method for computing the
singular values of convolutional layers, where the largest
one is the `2 norm. However, their method applies to only
the case when the stride of convolution is 1, and computing
singular values with their algorithm is still computationally
expensive and prohibit its usage in large scale deep learning.
To alleviate these problems, we theoretically analyze the `1
norm and `∞ norm of convolutional layer, and we find that
our method of computing norms is much more efficient than
that of (Sedghi et al., 2019).
Since 2D multi-channel convolutional layers (Conv2d)
(Goodfellow et al., 2016) are arguably the most widely used
convolutional layers in practice, we analyze Conv2d in this
paper while the analysis for other types of convolutional
layer should be similar. We first note that Conv2d with-
out bias is a linear transformation, which can be verified
by checking conv(αx) = α conv(x) and conv(x + y) =
conv(x) + conv(y) for any α ∈ R and any tensors x and
y with appropriate shape. Normally, the input and output
of Conv2d are 3D tensors (e.g., images) while the associ-
ated linear transformation takes 1D vectors as input. So
we reshape the input into a vector (only reshaping the
input channel excluding padding since padding elements
are not variables) and then Conv2d can be represented by
conv(x) =Mx+ b, where M is the linear transformation
matrix and b is the bias vector. Then the norm of Conv2d is
just the norm of M . We first state the following well known
facts about the norms of a matrix A ∈ Rm×n: ‖A‖1 =
max1≤j≤n
∑m
i=1 |Aij |, ‖A‖∞ = max1≤i≤m
∑n
j=1 |Aij |,
and ‖A‖2 = σmax(A), where σmax(A) is the largest sin-
gular value of A. While the exact computation of M is
complicated, we can analyze how the norm ‖M‖p is related
to the convolutional kernel K, which is a 4D tensor in the
case of Conv2d.
By carefully inspecting how the output elements of Conv2d
are related to the input elements, we find M is basically like
the matrix in Figure 1 (d). The rows of M can be formed
by convolving a 3D “slice” of the 4D kernel with the 3D
input channels and inspecting which elements on the input
channels are being convolved with the 3D kernel slice. If the
stride of convolution is 1, M is indeed a doubly circulant
matrix (Goodfellow et al., 2016; Sedghi et al., 2019) like
the one in Figure 1 (d). However, when the stride is not 1
or there is padding in the input channel, the patterns in M
could be much more complicated, which is not addressed
in existing analytical formulas (Gouk et al., 2018; Sedghi
et al., 2019). We take stride and padding into account and
properly address these issues. To obtain a theoretical re-
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(d) The upper left part of the linear transformation matrix of the 2D multi-channel convolutional
layer for (a) (b) (c) with stride 1 and no padding. With padding and various strides, the pattern of
the linear transformation matrix is more complicated, but these have been properly addressed in
our theorem.
Figure 1: An illustration of the linear transformation matrix of a convolutional layer.
sult of the Lipschitz properties of Conv2d, we present the
following assumption, which basically means that the con-
volutional kernel can be completely covered by the input
channel (excluding padding) during convolution.
Setting. Let conv : Rdin×hin×win → Rdout×hout×wout be
a 2D multi-channel convolutional layer with a 4D kernel
K ∈ Rdout×din×k1×k2 . Suppose the vertical stride of conv
is s1 and horizontal stride is s2, and padding size is p1 and
p2. We need the following assumption, which holds for most
convolutional layers used in practice.
Assumption 1. Let c1 and c2 be the smallest positive
integers such that c1s1 ≥ p1 and c2s2 ≥ p2. Assume
k1 + c1s1 − p1 ≤ hin and k2 + c2s2 − p2 ≤ win, and
the padding (if any) for the input of conv is zero padding.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The indices set
for the last two dimensions of K is N := {(k, t) : 1 ≤ k ≤
k1, 1 ≤ t ≤ k2}. Let ∼ be a binary relation onN such that,
if indices (a, b) and (c, d) satisfy (a− c) ≡ 0 (mod s1) and
(b− d) ≡ 0 (mod s2), then (a, b) ∼ (c, d). LetA(a,b) ⊆ N
denote the largest set3 of indices such that (a, b) ∈ A(a,b)
and for all (c, d) ∈ A(a,b), (c, d) ∼ (a, b) and 0 ≤ c− a ≤
hin+2p1−k1 and 0 ≤ d−b ≤ win+2p2−k2. Let S be a set
of indices sets defined as S := {A(a,b) : (a, b) ∈ N}. Let
M:,n be the n-th column of the linear transformation matrix
M of conv, and let nz(M:,n) be the set of nonzero elements
of M:,n. Then for n = 1, 2, . . . , dinhinwin, there exists an
indices setA ∈ S such that nz(M:,n) ⊆ {Ki,j,k,t : 1 ≤ i ≤
dout, (k, t) ∈ A}, where j = dn/(hinwin)e. Furthermore,
for j = 1, 2, . . . , din, for all A ∈ S, there exists a column
M:,n of M , where (j − 1)hinwin < n ≤ jhinwin, such
that nz(M:,n) ⊇ {Ki,j,k,t : 1 ≤ i ≤ dout, (k, t) ∈ A}.
The proof of Lemma 1 is lengthy and is deferred to the
Appendix. The overall idea of the lemma is that it links the
nonzero elements of every column of M to the elements in
the convolutional kernel, which is very useful because the `1
3By largest set we mean adding any other indices to A(a,b)
would violate the conditions that follow.
norm of M is exactly the maximum of the absolute column
sum of M . Now we are ready to show how to calculate the
norms of Conv2d.
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then the `1 norm
and `∞ norm and an upper bound of the `2 norm of conv
are given by
‖ conv ‖1 = max
1≤j≤din
max
A∈S
∑
(k,t)∈A
dout∑
i=1
|Ki,j,k,t|, (1)
‖ conv ‖∞ = max
1≤i≤dout
din∑
j=1
k1∑
k=1
k2∑
t=1
|Ki,j,k,t|, (2)
‖ conv ‖2 ≤
(
houtwout
dout∑
i=1
din∑
j=1
k1∑
k=1
k2∑
t=1
|Ki,j,k,t|2
) 1
2
(3)
where S is a set of indices sets defined in Lemma 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 is also lengthy and deferred to
the Appendix. For some remarks of the theorem and the
practical method of computing the set S, please see the
Appendix.
4. Do Large Norms Hurt Adversarial
Robustness?
Many works mentioned in the Introduction regularize the
norms of layers to improve robustness, while some authors
(Sokolic´ et al., 2017; Weng et al., 2018b; Yang et al., 2020)
pointed out that local Lipschitzness is what really matters
to adversarial robustness. In the setting of neural networks,
the relations and distinctions between global Lipschitzness,
local Lipschitzness, and the norms of layers are unclear. We
devote this section to investigate their connections.
To deduce the prevailing claim that large norms hurt ad-
versarial robustness, one must go through the following
reasoning: large norms of layers→ large global Lipschitz
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constant of the network→ large local Lipschitz constant in
the neighborhood of samples→ the output of the network
changes so sharply around samples that the prediction is
changed→ reducing adversarial robustness. However, there
are at least two serious issues at the first and second arrow
in the above reasoning. The first issue is that large norms of
individual layers do not necessarily cause the global Lips-
chitz constant of the network to be large, as demonstrated
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. There exists a feedforward network with
ReLU activation where the norms of all layers can be arbi-
trarily large while the Lipschitz constant of the network is
0.
Proof. Consider an L-layer feedforward network with
ReLU activation (denoted by σ(·)) where the weight ma-
trices of all layers are diagonal matrices (without bias for
simplicity) and denote the diagonal of the weight matrix of
the i-th layer as di. In the network there are two consecutive
layers where dj  dj+1 = 0, where  denotes element-
wise multiplication. Denote the input of the j-th layer as
xj−1. Then the output of j-th layer is xj = σ(xj−1  dj).
And xj+1 = σ(xj  dj+1). For any input x0 ∈ Rn, we
have xj+1 ≡ 0. Thus, the output of the entire network is
always 0, which means its Lipschitz constant is 0. Since for
all i ∈ [L], at least one element in di can be arbitrarily large,
then the norm of each layer can be arbitrarily large, which
completes the proof.
Although the network in the proof is a very simple one, it
illustrates that the coupling between layers could make the
actual Lipschitz constant of a neural net much smaller than
we can expect from the norms of layers. A related discus-
sion of coupling between layers is presented in (Virmaux &
Scaman, 2018). This proposition breaks the logical chain at
the first arrow in the above reasoning of large norms hurting
adversarial robustness. The second issue in the reasoning is
that, even if the global Lipschitz constant of a neural net-
work is very large, it can still be adversarially robust. This
is because, local Lipschitzness, which means the output
of a network does not change sharply in the neighborhood
of samples, is already sufficient for adversarial robustness,
and it has no requirement on the global Lipschitz constant
(Sokolic´ et al., 2017; Weng et al., 2018b; Yang et al., 2020).
In the next paragraph, we will first show that under a mild
assumption, robust models can be achieved provably with
neural networks, and then we will show that the Lipschitz
constant of a robust model can be arbitrarily large, also
provably.
Since we are primarily interested in classification task, our
discussion will be confined to this task. We first need some
notations. Let X ⊂ Rn be the instance space and Y =
{1, . . . , C} be the (finite) label set where C is the number
of classes. Let D be the probability measure of X , i.e., for a
subset A ⊂ X , D(A) gives the probability of observing a
point x ∈ A. LetX be endowed with any metric d of interest
in the adversarial attack. Let B(x, ) := {x˜ : d(x, x˜) ≤ }.
Let f : X → Y denote the underlying labeling function
(which we do not know), and let X (c) ⊂ X be the set of
class c. The robust accuracy is defined as follows, similar to
the “astuteness” in (Wang et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2020).
Definition 1 (Robust accuracy). We say a classifier
g : Rn → R has robust accuracy γ in adversarial attack at
 ≥ 0 if γ = D({x ∈ X : |g(x˜) − f(x)| < 0.5 for all x˜ ∈
B(x, )}).
Here, for convenience of proof, we use a classifier map-
ping to the real number, and its prediction is determined by
choosing the nearest label to its output. Thus, if the output
of g is at most 0.5 apart from the true label, then g gives
the correct label. Our next theorem shows that, under a mild
assumption from (Yang et al., 2020), there is a neural net-
work that can achieve robust accuracy 1 (i.e., the highest
accuracy).
Assumption 2. The sets of any two classes are 2-
separable: inf{d(x(i), x(j)) : x(i) ∈ X (i), x(j) ∈ X (j), i 6=
j} > 2.
Theorem 2 (Realizability of robust classifiers). Let ρ : R→
R be any non-affine continuous function which is contin-
uously differentiable at at least one point, with nonzero
derivative at that point. If Assumption 2 holds, then there
exists a feedforward neural network with ρ being the activa-
tion function that has robust accuracy 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume X ∈ [0, 1]n. De-
fine the robust cover for class c asR(c) := ∪x∈X (c)B(x, ).
Let cl(R(c)) be the closure ofR(c). Then we can show that
for every pair of two classes i 6= j, cl(R(i))∩ cl(R(j)) = ∅.
First note that R(i) ∩ R(j) = ∅ by Assumption 2. Then
it suffices to show that for every limit point p of R(i),
p /∈ cl(R(j)), which will be proved by contradiction. Sup-
pose p is a limit point of R(i) and p ∈ cl(R(j)). Then for
all ξ > 0, there exist r(i) ∈ R(i) and r(j) ∈ R(j) such
that d(p, r(i)) ≤ ξ and d(p, r(j)) ≤ ξ. Since there exist
x(i) ∈ X (i) and x(j) ∈ X (j) such that d(x(i), r(i)) ≤ 
and d(x(j), r(j)) ≤ . By triangle inequality, we have
d(x(i), p) ≤ ξ +  and d(x(j), p) ≤ ξ + . Using trian-
gle inequality again, we have d(x(i), x(j)) ≤ 2(ξ + ).
Then sup d(x(i), x(j)) → 2 as ξ → 0, which implies
inf{d(x(i), x(j)) : x(i) ∈ X (i), x(j) ∈ X (j)} ≤ 2. This
contradicts Assumption 2 and thus for every limit point p of
X (i), p /∈ cl(R(j)). By symmetry, we have for every limit
point p ofX (j), p /∈ cl(R(i)), Thus, cl(R(i))∩cl(R(j)) = ∅
for any i 6= j. Let 1cl(R(c)) be the indicator function of
the set cl(R(c)), i.e., 1cl(R(c))(x) = 1 if x ∈ cl(R(c))
else = 0. Let X = ∪Cc=1cl(R(c)) and define a function
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h : X → Y by h(x) = ∑Cc=1 c · 1cl(R(c))(x). Note that
h can correctly predict the labels of points in the set X
and thus have robust accuracy 1. Note that X is closed and
bounded and thus compact, and h is continuous on X , i.e.,
h ∈ C(X ,R). Then, by Theorem 3.2 in (Kidger & Lyons,
2020), for all ζ > 0, there exists a feedforward neural net-
work F : X → R with ρ being the activation function such
that supx∈X |F (x) − h(x)| ≤ ζ. Let ζ = 0.1. Then the
robust accuracy of the neural network F is just the robust
accuracy of h, which is D(X ) = 1, which is the desired
result.
We notice that Yang et al. (2020) proved a related result that
there exists a function that has small local Lipschitz con-
stants can achieve robust accuracy 1. Our result (Theorem 2)
is different from theirs in that we prove that a neural net-
work that can be realized on a digital computer can obtain
robust accuracy 1 while they proved an abstract function
f can obtain robust accuracy 1, where the definition of f
relies on knowing the data distribution D and f may not be
realized on a digital computer. Yang et al. (2020) also em-
pirically showed that real-world image datasets are typically
2-separable and thus there should exist neural networks
that achieve high robust accuracy. Using Theorem 2, we
are ready to show that a neural network having robust accu-
racy 1 can have arbitrarily large Lipschitz constant, as in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let ρ : R→ R be any non-affine continuous
function which is continuously differentiable at at least one
point, with nonzero derivative at that point. If Assumption 2
holds, then for all ξ > 0, there exists a feedforward neural
network with ρ being the activation function that achieves
robust accuracy 1 and its Lipschitz constant is at least ξ.
Proof. We use the notations in the proof of Theorem 2.
Without loss of generality, assume X ∈ [0, 1]n. Let X˜ =
X ∪[2, 3]n∪[u, 4]n, where u ∈ (3, 4). ThenX ∩[2, 3]n = ∅
and X ∩ [u, 4]n = ∅ and [2, 3]n∩ [u, 4]n = ∅, and thus X˜ is
compact. Let h(x) =
∑C
c=1 c·1cl(R(c))(x)−1.1·1[2,3]n(x)+
0.1 · 1[u,4]n(x). Then following the same argument in the
proof of Theorem 2, h ∈ C(X˜ ,R). Let ζ = 0.1. Then
there exists a feedforward neural network F with ρ being
the activation function that achieves robust accuracy 1 and
supx∈X |F (x) − h(x)| ≤ ζ. Consider two points t1 =
(3, 3, . . . , 3) ∈ [2, 3]n and t2 = (u, u, . . . , u) ∈ [u, 4]n.
The Lipschitz constant of the neural network F has a lower
bound L = |F (t1)− F (t2)|/‖t1 − t2‖ ≥ 1/‖t1 − t2‖. As
u→ 3, ‖t1 − t2‖ → 0 and thus L→∞, which completes
the proof.
Proposition 2 shows that neural networks that have large
Lipschitz constant can be adversarially robust because they
can have small local Lipschitz constants in the instance
domain. This proposition implies that what really matters
is the local Lipschitz property of the network instead of the
global one. A closely related work (Yang et al., 2020) also
stresses the importance of controlling local Lipschitzness
of neural nets, where they showed a function that has small
local Lipschitz constant can achieve robust accuracy 1.
On the other hand, although enforcing a small global Lips-
chitz constant can ensure local Lipschitzness, it may harm
the expressive power of the network and hurt standard ac-
curacy. Let us consider fitting the function f(x) = 1/x in
the interval (0.5, 1), then no 1-Lipschitz function could fit it
well since the slope of the function in that interval is as large
as 4. Thus, enforcing global Lipschitzness may result in
hurting standard accuracy a lot while obtaining only a slight
improvement in robustness (e.g., as in (Li et al., 2019b)).
In order to further investigate how norms influence the ad-
versarial robustness in practice, we further propose a novel
norm-regularization method in the next section.
5. A Regularization Method: Norm Decay
Equipped with Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we present an algorithm
termed norm decay to control (or regularize) the norm of
fully-connected layers and convolutional layers. Then we
investigate how norm decay influences generalization and
adversarial robustness in experiments.
The norm decay approach is to add a regularization term to
the original loss function L(θ), where θ is the parameter, to
form an augmented loss function:
min
θ
L(θ) + β
∑
i
‖θ(i)‖p (4)
where θ(i) denotes the linear transformation matrix of the
i-th layer and β is a hyperparameter, and the summation is
over all fully connected layers and convolutional layers, and
the norm p could be 1 or∞.
Form Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), we can see that the `1 and `∞ norm
depends on only some elements in the kernel, which means
the gradient of norm w.r.t. kernel elements (∇θ‖θ(i)‖p) are
typically sparse. Besides, since the norm is the sum of the
absolute values of these elements, the gradient w.r.t. a single
kernel element is either 1 or -1 or 0, which makes the com-
putation of gradient very efficient. After updating the kernel
parameters using an optimizer such as SGD, the elements
that contribute to the norm may become completely differ-
ent from those before the update (due to the max operation
in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)), which could cause non-smoothness
(i.e., rapid change) of the gradient ∇θ‖θ(i)‖p. To smooth
the gradient change and stabilize training, we introduce a
momentum γ which retains a portion of the gradient of the
norms in the last step. See Algorithm 1 for the details.
Apart from norm decay, we also tried projecting the norm
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Algorithm 1 Norm Decay
Input: loss function L (assuming it is to be minimized),
parameters θ, momentum γ, regularization parameter β
Output: parameters θ
1: h← 0 (initialize the gradient of norms of layers)
2: repeat
3: g ← ∇θL
4: Compute p, the gradient of `1 or `∞ norm of each
fully-connected and convolutional layer
5: h← γ · h+ (1− γ) · p
6: g ← g + β · h
7: θ ← SGD(θ, g)
8: until convergence
of fully connected and convolutional layers to a specific
threshold like Sedghi et al. (2019) do. Since we know which
elements in the convolution kernel contribute to the norm,
we can formulate the projection problem as `1 ball pro-
jection (Duchi et al., 2008). The experimental results of
projecting norms are presented in the Appendix.
6. Experiments
In the first part, we conduct extensive experiments to inves-
tigate if regularizing the norms of CNN layers is effective
in improving adversarial robustness. In the second part, we
compare the norms of the layers of adversarially robust
CNNs against their non-adversarially robust counterparts.
6.1. Regularizing Norms Improves Generalization but
Can Hurt Adversarial Robustness
To better understand the effect of regularizing the norm of
CNN layers, we conduct experiments with various models
on CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009). Specially, we use
three approaches, including weight decay (WD), singular
value clipping (SVC) (Sedghi et al., 2019), and norm decay
(ND), to regularize the norms. Here, we only use the norm-
regularization methods that do not change the architecture
of the network, and thus exclude the GroupSort (Anil et al.,
2019) and BCOP (Li et al., 2019b). We also exclude the
methods that may not regularize the true norms (e.g., reshap-
ing the convolutional kernel into a matrix) such as Parseval
Regularization (Cisse et al., 2017) and (Gouk et al., 2018).
Experimental setup. We set the regularization parameter
to different values and test generalization and adversarial
robustness of the models on test set. In norm decay, we
simply set the hyperparameter γ (momentum) to 0.5 and
test the other hyperparameter β in {10−5, . . . , 10−2}. We
also test the regularization parameter of weight decay in
{10−5, . . . , 10−2} and test SVC by clipping the singular
values to {2.0, 1.5, 1.0, 0.5}, respectively, following the set-
ting in the original paper. We use four CNN architectures in
our experiments, including VGG-11 (Simonyan & Zisser-
man, 2015), ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016), SENet-18 (Hu
et al., 2018), and RegNetX-200MF (Radosavovic et al.,
2020). We use the SGD optimizer with momentum of 0.9
and set the initial learning to 0.01. We train the models for
120 epochs and decay the learning rate by a factor of 0.1 at
epoch 75, 90, and 100. After finishing training, we use the
state-of-the-art attack “Auto Attack” (Croce & Hein, 2020)
to attack the trained CNNs. The experiments are conducted
on a Linux machine with 2 GTX 1080 Ti GPUs and an Intel
Core i5-9400F 6-core CPU and 32GB RAM.
The result is shown in Table 1. Since we find that all models
trained with WD, SVC, and ND have basically zero robust
accuracy under `∞ attack at  = 8/255 and  = 4/255
(which suggests that Auto Attack is arguably the strongest
published adversarial attack), we set  = 1/255 to see the
actual effect of regularizing norms. Because of that, we
first conclude that these regularization methods cannot im-
prove adversarial robustness by reducing norms when facing
strong attack (in the sense of large ). From Table 1, we can
see that the four regularization methods typically improve
generalization. However, as the regularization becomes
stronger, the norms of the CNN layers become smaller (see
Figure 2) while the robust accuracy could slightly decrease.
The reduction in robust accuracy is especially evident when
the regularization is the strongest and the norms are the
smallest (in the first column of each regularization method
in Table 1). This result is very surprising and contradicts the
prevailing claim that small norms of CNN layers improve
robustness (Szegedy et al., 2014; Cisse et al., 2017; Anil
et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019b). We can see that there seems
to be a trade-off between standard (clean) accuracy and ro-
bust accuracy. When the clean accuracy gets a higher value,
the robust accuracy typically gets a lower value. This trade-
off has been pointed out by Tsipras et al. (2019), and they
proved that the trade-off is intrinsic when the distribution
of two different classes is “mixed”. However, Yang et al.
(2020) have shown that the CIFAR-10 training set and test
set are both 2-separable for  much larger than the typical
values used in adversarial attack. Therefore, by Theorem 2,
there should exist a neural network that achieves robust ac-
curacy 1 and there should be no intrinsic trade-off between
standard accuracy and robust accuracy.
The reason for this phenomenon may be that regularizing
the norms in fact suppresses the power of CNNs to become
local Lipschitz. From the results in the last section, we know
that large norms do not necessarily result in large local
Lipschitz constants. Thus, in an unconstrained parameter
space (in the case of no regularization) the network may be
able to find a minimizer (w.r.t. the loss) that has better local
Lipschitzness. When the parameter space is constrained
(due to regularization), the network may need to sacrifice
local Lipschitzness to retain standard accuracy, which is the
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(a) plain (b) `1 ND: β = 10−5 (c) `1 ND: β = 10−4 (d) `1 ND: β = 10−3 (e) `1 ND: β = 10−2
Figure 2: The `1 norms of fully connected layers and convolutional layers in ResNet trained without regularization (plain)
and with `1 norm decay. The plots for other regularization methods are similar and are placed in the Appendix.
plain weight decay singular value clipping `1 norm decay `∞ norm decay
model ACC — 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5
vgg Clean 90.4 91.6 91.7 90.1 90.2 87.6 89.1 90.0 89.9 88.1 91.1 90.6 90.8 91.8 91.1 90.8 90.6Robust 60.2 56.3 60.5 60.6 60.3 48.8 52.2 54.1 56.7 56.5 62.5 61.1 60.1 56.9 60.0 60.8 60.1
resnet Clean 93.2 94.3 94.1 93.1 92.7 93.6 94.0 94.2 93.8 92.5 93.4 93.5 93.4 93.0 93.8 93.1 93.0Robust 37.0 28.2 33.7 33.9 40.9 35.2 41.7 43.2 39.8 24.5 37.7 38.3 37.5 20.0 34.7 38.9 37.6
senet Clean 93.1 94.2 93.9 93.0 92.4 93.8 94.2 93.8 94.2 92.3 93.8 93.3 93.3 93.0 93.6 92.8 93.2Robust 35.7 23.5 32.8 37.0 34.8 30.5 35.6 35.2 37.4 33.6 36.0 38.2 36.7 28.6 31.0 37.6 37.4
regnet Clean 91.8 93.6 94.4 92.3 91.3 93.9 93.4 93.0 92.4 93.7 92.3 91.6 91.9 93.4 92.0 91.8 91.9Robust 34.8 23.7 30.3 30.0 31.0 27.7 28.8 29.0 28.8 29.2 31.1 28.1 34.3 23.2 27.7 27.9 30.6
Table 1: Comparison of clean accuracy (%) and robust accuracy (%) of 4 CNN models trained with different norm-
regularization methods on CIFAR-10. The second row corresponds to the values of regularization parameters. Robust
accuracy is tested with standard Auto Attack (Croce & Hein, 2020) under `∞ metric at  = 1/255.
training target.
Although the proposed norm decay may slightly reduce the
adversarial robustness, it still serves as a novel and promis-
ing regularizer for CNNs in improving standard generaliza-
tion. We also find that our method for computing norms of
CNN layers is up to 14000 times faster than that of (Vir-
maux & Scaman, 2018; Sedghi et al., 2019). Please see the
Appendix for efficiency comparison.
6.2. The Norms of Adversarially Robust Networks
Equipped with our efficient approaches to computing norms
of convolutional layers, we further test how the norms of ad-
versarially robust CNNs differ from their non-adversarially
robust counterparts. Specifically, we use three adversarial
training frameworks, namely, PGD-AT (Madry et al., 2018),
ALP (Kannan et al., 2018), and TRADES (Zhang et al.,
2019) to train the four models, namely, VGG-11, ResNet-18,
SENet-18, and RegNetX-200MF. The experimental setting
is the same as that in the last subsection except the initial
learning rate is set to 0.1 by following the setting of Pang
et al. (2020). After finishing training, we compute the `1
norms of all layers in the CNNs with/without adversarial
training. The result is shown in Figure 3. We can see that
the norms of layers of adversarially robust CNNs are com-
parable or even larger than their non-adversarially robust
counterparts (e.g., the VGG and SENet trained with ALP
have especially larger norms while having much higher
robust accuracy than the plain models). Due to space lim-
itation, we put the comparison of the norms of individual
layers in the Appendix. These findings consistently show
that large norms of CNNs do not hurt adversarial robustness
and what really matters is the local Lipschitzness of the
networks.
Along with the observation that norm-regularization meth-
ods proposed by other authors only slightly improve ro-
bustness of neural network (as we have discussed in the
Introduction), we believe that regularization of norms is in-
effective in improving adversarial robustness. Since we have
prove in Proposition 2 that there exists a neural network that
has small local Lipschitz constants achieve robust accuracy
1, future research may further explore the approaches of en-
forcing local Lipschitzness (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017;
Weng et al., 2018a), its variants (Wong & Kolter, 2018;
Croce et al., 2019), and randomized smoothing (Lecuyer
et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019a) where the
smoothed classifier has small local Lipschitz constants in
the neighborhood of instances.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we theoretically characterize the `1 norm and
`∞ norm of convolutional layers and present efficient ap-
proaches for computing the exact norms. Our methods are
extremely efficient among the existing methods for comput-
ing norms of convolutional layers. We present norm decay,
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Figure 3: Comparison of the distribution of norms of the layers of four CNN architectures trained with different adversarial
training methods on CIFAR-10. The density is fitted using a Gaussian kernel in the Python package seaborn. The two
numbers beside each training method are the clean accuracy and robust accuracy, respectively. The robust accuracy is
evaluated with standard Auto Attack (Croce & Hein, 2020) under `∞ metric at  = 8/255.
a novel regularization method, which can improve gener-
alization of CNNs. We prove that robust classifiers can be
realized with neural networks – a piece of encouraging news
to the deep learning community.
We theoretically analyze the relationship between global
Lipschitzness, local Lipschitzness, and the norms of layers.
In particular, we show that large norms of layers do not
necessarily cause a large global Lipschitz constant and a
large global Lipschitz constant does not necessarily cause
large local Lipschitz constants in the sample space. In the
experiments, we find that regularizing the norms may not
improve adversarial robustness and even slightly hurts ro-
bustness. Moreover, CNNs trained with adversarial train-
ing frameworks actually have comparable and even larger
layer norms than their non-adversarially robust counterparts,
which shows that large norms of layers do not matter. Our
theoretical result (Proposition 2) also suggests that impos-
ing local Lipschitzness on neural nets can be an effective
approach in adversarial training, which sheds light on future
research.
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Appendix
A. Proof
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
For clarity, letC ∈ Rdin×hin×win denote the 3D input chan-
nels of Conv2d. In the vectorization of C, We first vectorize
C1,:,: (as shown in Figure 1a), and then vectorize C2,:,:, and
so on, which determines the order of input elements in the
vectorized input vector x.
Proof of Lemma 1. The vectorized convolution for conv is
conv(x) =Mx, where x is the vectorization of input chan-
nels and the length of x is dinhinwin. By inspecting the
convolution operation, we first note that every nonzero ele-
ment in M is a kernel element in K. By the matrix-vector
multiplication Mx =
∑dinhinwin
n=1 xnM:,n, we have, for
every n = 1, . . . , dinhinwin, M:,n is multiplied by xn,
which is an element in the j-th input channel Cj,:,:, where
j = dn/(hinwin)e. For every i = 1, . . . , dout, the kernel
slice Ki,j,:,: is convolved with Cj,:,: that contains xn. Let
Gi be the set of kernel elements in Ki,j,:,: that are multi-
plied by xn. Let (a, b) be the smallest indices4 such that
Ki,j,a,b ∈ Gi. For all Ki,j,c,d ∈ Gi, (c, d) must satisfy
(a− c) ≡ 0 (mod s1) and (b− d) ≡ 0 (mod s2), i.e., their
vertical (resp. horizontal) distance must be a multiple of
the vertical (resp. horizontal) stride of conv. Then (c, d) ∼
(a, b). Besides, the total vertical (resp. horizontal) distance
the kernel can possibly shift on the input channel Cj,:,: must
be smaller than hin+2p1−k1 (resp.win+2p2−k2) (see Fig-
ure 4a). Thus (c, d) must satisfy 0 ≤ c−a ≤ hin+2p1−k1
and 0 ≤ d − b ≤ win + 2p2 − k2. Therefore, by the
construction of S, Gi ⊆ {Ki,j,k,t : (k, t) ∈ A(a,b)} where
A(a,b) ∈ S. Then nz(M:,n) = ∪douti=1 Gi ⊆ {Ki,j,k,t : 1 ≤
i ≤ dout, (k, t) ∈ A(a,b)}, which proves the first claim in
Lemma 1.
In the following proof, for a kernel slice5 Ki,j,:,:, we use
the coordinates of its upper left corner on the input channel
Cj,:,: to indicate its position. For example, at the begin-
ning of convolution, the kernel is at position P0,0. Note that
the coordinates of kernel are always multiples of strides.
By Assumption 1, we have k1 + c1s1 − p1 ≤ hin and
k2+c2s2−p2 ≤ win. Then Pc1s1,c2s2 is a legitimate kernel
position.6 At position Pc1s1,c2s2 , all kernel elements are mul-
tiplied by some input elements but not padding elements (see
Figure 4b). For any A ∈ S, let amax = max{a : (a, b) ∈
A} and bmax = max{b : (a, b) ∈ A}, and let amin =
4Both a and b are the smallest.
5For simplicity, a kernel slice is referred to as kernel in the text
that follows.
6By legitimate kernel position, we mean the kernel is within
the boundary of input channels (including padding, if any) and the
coordinates of kernel are multiples of strides.
min{a : (a, b) ∈ A} and bmin = min{b : (a, b) ∈ A}.
Let r1 and r2 be the largest integers such that r1s1 ≤
hin + 2p1 − k1 and r2s2 ≤ win + 2p2 − k2. By the defini-
tion of S , we have amax− amin ≤ r1s1 and bmax− bmin ≤
r2s2. Let amid = max(amin, amax − c1s1) and bmid =
max(bmin, bmax − c2s2). Then we have (amid, bmid) ∈ A
because (amid, bmid) ∼ (amax, bmax) and 0 ≤ amid −
amin ≤ hin + 2p1 − k1 and 0 ≤ bmid − bmin ≤ win +
2p2 − k2. Suppose when the kernel is at position Pc1s1,c2s2 ,
for any i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ dout and any j such that
1 ≤ j ≤ din, the kernel element Ki,j,amid,bmid is multiplied
by the element N on the j-th input channel.7 Then when the
kernel is at position Pc1s1−amax+amid,c2s2−bmax+bmid , the
kernel element Ki,j,amax,bmax is multiplied by N. And when
the kernel is at position Pc1s1+amid−amin,c2s2+bmid−bmin ,
the kernel element Ki,j,amin,bmin is multiplied by N. To
show the last two claims are true, we need to show
Pc1s1−amax+amid,c2s2−bmax+bmid is a legitimate kernel posi-
tion. We note that
c1s1 − amax + amid ={
c1s1 − amax + amin ≥ 0 if amin ≥ amax − c1s1
0 if amin < amax − c1s1
(5)
which shows that c1s1 − amax + amid ≥ 0 and
is a multiple of stride s1. Similarly, c2s2 − bmax +
bmid ≥ 0 and is a multiple of stride s2. Thus
Pc1s1−amax+amid,c2s2−bmax+bmid is a legitimate kernel posi-
tion. To see Pc1s1+amid−amin,c2s2+bmid−bmin is a legitimate
kernel position, we note that
c1s1 + amid − amin ={
c1s1 if amin ≥ amax − c1s1
amax − amin ≤ r1s1 if amin < amax − c1s1
(6)
Similarly, c2s2 + bmid − bmin = c2s2 or =
bmax − bmin ≤ r2s2. Since Pc1s1,c2s2 , Pc1s1,r2s2 ,
Pr1s1,c2s2 , and Pr1s1,r2s2 are legitimate kernel positions,
Pc1s1+amid−amin,c2s2+bmid−bmin is also a legitimate kernel
position.
Since both Ki,j,amax,bmax and Ki,j,amin,bmin are multiplied
by N, then for all (c, d) ∈ A, Ki,j,c,d is multiplied by N.
Let Gij be the set of kernel elements in Ki,j,:,: that are
multiplied by N and let Kij := {Ki,j,k,t : (k, t) ∈ A}.
Then Gij ⊇ Kij . Note that this is true for all i such that
1 ≤ i ≤ dout and all j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ din. Let M:,n
be the column of M such that M:,n is multiplied by N in
conv(x) = Mx. Clearly, (j − 1)hinwin < n ≤ jhinwin.
Recall that nz(M:,n) is the set of kernel elements that are
multiplied byN. And note that for the 2D multi-channel con-
volution conv, N is convolved with kernel slices Ki,j,:,: for
7Assumption 1 ensures that N is indeed an input element in-
stead of a padding element, and thus N is an element of x.
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(a) Kernel at position
Pc1s1−amax+amid,c2s2−bmax+bmid ;
Ki,j,amax,bmax is multiplied by N.
N
c1s1
c2s2
p1
p2
(b) Kernel at position Pc1s1,c2s2 ;
Ki,j,amid,bmid is multiplied by N.
N
win
hin
(c) Kernel at position
Pc1s1+amid−amin,c2s2+bmid−bmin ;
Ki,j,amin,bmin is multiplied by N.
Figure 4: An illustration of the proof of Lemma 1. The blue rectangle is the input channel excluding padding, which is
of size 7 × 7, i.e., hin = win = 7. Outside the blue rectangle is padding (p1 = p2 = 1). The grids are kernel elements
(kernel size k1 = k2 = 5). Strides are s1 = s2 = 2. The indices set of the yellow kernel elements is A(amin,bmin) ∈ S where
amin = bmin = 1. All yellow kernel elements are multiplied by N during convolution, which indicates Gij ⊇ Kij .
all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ dout. Then nz(M:,n) = ∪douti=1 Gij ⊇
∪douti=1 Kij = {Ki,j,k,t : 1 ≤ i ≤ dout, (k, t) ∈ A}, which
completes the proof.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Let F := {nz(M:,n) : 1 ≤ n ≤
dinhinwin} and T Aj := {Ki,j,k,t : 1 ≤ i ≤ dout, (k, t) ∈
A}, and let H := {T Aj : 1 ≤ j ≤ din,A ∈ S}. Define a
function abs from sets of real numbers to non-negative
numbers abs : C 7→ ∑c∈C |c|. Let R := F ∪ H and
W := {abs(C) : C ∈ R}. Then W is bounded above by
abs(set(K)), where set(K) is the set of all elements of
4D kernel K, as we now explain. For every C ∈ F , by
Lemma 1 we have C ⊆ B for some B ∈ H, and thus
abs(C) ≤ abs(B). But for every B ∈ H, B ⊆ set(K) and
thus abs(B) ≤ abs(set(K)). Then abs(C) ≤ abs(set(K)),
which proves the last claim. Since W is a finite set,
maxW = supW < ∞. Then there exists a set C ∈ R
such that abs(C) = maxW . Suppose C ∈ F . Then by
Lemma 1 there exists B ∈ H such that C ⊆ B, and thus
abs(C) ≤ abs(B). However, since abs(C) = maxW , we
also have abs(C) ≥ abs(B). Thus abs(C) = abs(B). On
the other hand, suppose C ∈ H. Then by Lemma 1 there
exists B ∈ F such that C ⊆ B, and thus abs(C) ≤ abs(B).
However, since abs(C) = maxW , we also have abs(C) ≥
abs(B). Thus abs(C) = abs(B). The last two results show
that there are always a pair of sets C ∈ H and B ∈ F
such that abs(C) = abs(B) = maxW . Then ‖ conv ‖1 =
‖M‖1 = maxn abs(nz(M:,n)) = abs(B) = abs(C) =
max1≤j≤din maxA∈S
∑
(k,t)∈A
∑dout
i=1 |Ki,j,k,t|.
Let y = conv(x) = Mx. Then yn = 〈Mn,:, x〉. We
note that, for all elements yn on output channels, yn is
also the result of a kernel slice Kk,:,:,: being convolved
with a part of the input channels C:,i:i+k1,j:j+k2 , where
k = dn/(houtwout)e and C is the input channels including
padding. By Assumption 1, when i = c1s1 and j = c2s2,
set(C:,i:i+k1,j:j+k2) ⊆ set(D) where D is the input
channels excluding padding (see Figure 4b where the
blue rectangle is a slice of D). In this case, it is clear that
nz(Mn,:) = set(Kk,:,:,:). When the part of input channels
C:,i:i+k1,j:j+k2 being convolved with Kk,:,:,: includes
padding, nz(Mn,:) ⊂ set(Kk,:,:,:), because x = vec(D)
does not include padding elements (see the matrix in
Figure 1 for an illustration). Note that, as convolution
produces output elements yn one by one, it iterates all
kernel slices Kk,:,:,: for k in the range [1, dout]. Thus,
maxn abs(nz(Mn,:)) = max1≤k≤dout abs(set(Kk,:,:,:)).
Then, ‖ conv ‖∞ = ‖M‖∞ = maxn abs(nz(Mn,:)) =
max1≤k≤dout abs(set(Kk,:,:,:)) =
max1≤i≤dout
∑din
j=1
∑k1
k=1
∑k2
t=1 |Ki,j,k,t|.
By the result we have just obtained, for every output element
yn = 〈Mn,:, x〉, nz(Mn,:) = set(Kk,:,:,:) or nz(Mn,:) ⊂
set(Kk,:,:,:). And for a fixed k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ dout,
Kk,:,:,: performs exactly houtwout times convolution to pro-
duce houtwout elements on the output channels (see the
matrix in Figure 1 for an illustration). Therefore,
‖M‖F =
( douthoutwout∑
n=1
∑{
t2 : t ∈ nz(Mn,:)
}) 12
(7)
≤
( dout∑
i=1
houtwout
∑{
t2 : t ∈ set(Ki,:,:,:)
}) 12
(8)
=
(
houtwout
dout∑
i=1
din∑
j=1
k1∑
k=1
k2∑
t=1
|Ki,j,k,t|2
) 1
2
(9)
The fact that ‖ conv ‖2 = ‖M‖2 ≤ ‖M‖F completes the
proof.
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A.3. Some Remarks of Theorem 1
Remark 1. Following the methods in the proof of Theorem 1,
we can compute ‖M‖F exactly, though the formula for
‖M‖F might be complicated.
Remark 2. If there is no padding, then for all n
such that 1 ≤ n ≤ douthoutwout, nz(Mn,:) =
set(Kk,:,:,:) for some k. Then we have ‖M‖F =
(houtwout
∑dout
i=1
∑din
j=1
∑k1
k=1
∑k2
t=1 |Ki,j,k,t|2)
1
2 . Be-
sides, it is possible that ‖M‖2 = ‖M‖F. If the two condi-
tions hold, the bound for the `2 norm is sharp: ‖ conv ‖2 =
(houtwout
∑dout
i=1
∑din
j=1
∑k1
k=1
∑k2
t=1 |Ki,j,k,t|2)
1
2 .
B. Computing the Set S and the Gradient
In Lemma 1, we construct the set of indices sets S in a way
that is convenient for the proof. Here, we provide a practical
way – a Python function – for computing the set S.
Moreover, we use a slightly different version of momentum
for the gradient of norms in our experiments. In Algorithm 1,
the momentum is applied as follows: h← γ ·h+(1−γ) ·p.
In practice, it would be more convenient and efficient to first
decay the historical gradient h ← γ · h and then copy the
(sparse) gradient of norms in this step to h. This approach is
basically the same as the standard one while it updates the
gradient of norms slightly faster than the standard one.
Python Functions for Computing S
def partition(h, w, k, s, p):
”””
The main function for computine the set S.
Inputs:
h − height of the input image
w − width of the input image
k − kernel size
s − stride size
p − padding size
Output:
S − the set of indices set
”””
if type(k) is not tuple:
k = (k, k)
if type(s) is not tuple:
s = (s, s)
if type(p) is not tuple:
p = (p, p)
r0 = min(k[0], h + 2 ∗ p[0] − k[0] + 1)
r1 = min(k[1], w + 2 ∗ p[1] − k[1] + 1)
all classes = []
init classes = equivalence class(0, 0, (r0, r1), s)
all classes += init classes
t = (k[0] − r0, k[1] − r1)
for i in range(0, t[0]+1):
for j in range(0, t[1]+1):
if i == 0 and j == 0:
continue
classes new = increment(init classes, i, j)
all classes += classes new
idx set = []
for classes in all classes:
tmp = []
for c in classes:
tmp.append(sub2lin(c, k[0], k[1]))
idx set.append(tmp)
# remove redundancy
idx set = sorted(idx set, key=lambda x:len(x))
idx set2 = [(c, set(c)) for c in idx set]
for i in range(len(idx set2)):
c, sc = idx set2[i]
for j in range(i+1, len(idx set2)):
c , sc = idx set2[j]
if sc <= sc :
idx set.remove(c)
break
return idx set
def equivalence class(x, y, r, s):
all idx = []
for i in range(x, r[0]):
for j in range(y, r[1]):
all idx.append((i,j))
classes = []
while len(all idx) > 0:
x0, y0 = all idx[0]
tmp = []
for x in range(x0, r[0], s[0]):
for y in range(y0, r[1], s[1]):
tmp.append((x, y))
all idx.remove((x, y))
classes.append(tmp)
return classes
def increment(classes, i, j):
classes new = []
for eqv in classes:
tmp = [(c[0] + i, c[1] + j) for c in eqv]
classes new.append(tmp)
return classes new
def sub2lin(sub, k0, k1):
return sub[1] ∗ k0 + sub[0]
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C. More Experimental Results
Due to space limitation in the main text, we provide more
experimental results here.
C.1. Algorithmic Efficiency Comparison
We compare the efficiency of three methods that can com-
pute the exact norms of convolutional layers, including
computing the `2 norm with power iteration (Virmaux &
Scaman, 2018) and circulant matrix (Sedghi et al., 2019)
and computing the `1 norm and `∞ norm with Eq. (1) and
Eq. (2), respectively. The result is shown in Table 3, which
shows that our approaches are much faster (up to 14000
times faster) than the others, while our approaches are equiv-
alent to the others in computing norms (see Section C.3
paragraph 2).
C.2. Clean and Robust Accuracy of CNNs with
Norm-Regularization
In the experiments, we test the regularization parame-
ter of norm decay (ND) and weight decay (WD) in
{10−5, . . . , 10−1} and test the parameter of singular value
clipping (SVC) in {2.0, 1.5, 1.0, 0.5, 0.1}, while in the main
text the strongest regularization (corresponds to 0.1 for SVC
and 10−1 for ND and WD) is omitted due to space limitation.
The complete result is shown in Table 2. Again, we notice
that regularization can improve generalization but has little
effect on adversarial robustness. Besides, regularization that
is too strong basically reduces both standard accuracy and
robust accuracy.
C.3. How the Norms Change During Training under
Norm-Regularization?
We calculate the `1 norm (or the `∞ norm when applying `∞
norm decay) of all layers during the training of CNNs under
norm-regularization and plot the results in Figure 5, 6, and 7.
Here, we only show the norms of the ResNet layers since
the other three models present similar patterns in the change
of the norms. Apart from convolutional and fully connected
layers, we also show the norms of batch normalization layers
(BN) (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015). The batch normalization is
applied as follows:
xˆi = γi
xi − µi
σi
+ βi, (10)
where i is the index of features, and µi and σi are respec-
tively the mean and standard deviation of the i-th feature.
Since µi and σi are fixed at inference time, BN is simply
an affine transformation and its `1, `2, and `∞ norms are
maxi γi/σi.
We can see in Figure 5 that all regularization methods can
effectively regularize the norms of convolutional and fully
connected layers when the regularization parameter is set
properly. Moreover, the `1 norms in SVC (Figure 5 g-k)
remain basically the same during training. Since SVC clips
the `2 norms to a fixed value, it indicates that the `1 norm
is strongly correlated to the `2 norm. It shows that our ap-
proaches to computing the `1 and `∞ norms for convolu-
tional layers are equivalent to computing the `2 norms while
our methods are much more efficient.
We notice that in some cases the norms of BN explode, as
shown in Figure 6. Since we do not explicitly regularize the
norms of BN, it seems that the explosion is compensation
for the reduction in the norms of convolutional and fully
connected layers. In order to investigate whether regulariz-
ing the norms of BN improves adversarial robustness, we
further project the `1 (also `∞) norms of BN to a fixed value
after applying norm decay at each step. The clean and robust
accuracy is shown in Table 4 and the change of norms dur-
ing training is shown in Figure 7. We use projection instead
of extending norm decay to BN because we find that norm
decay is too “soft” to regularize the norms of BN (while
projection is a hard way for regularization). From Figure 7,
we can see that the norms of BN, convolutional layers, and
fully connected layers are regularized properly. However,
the robust accuracy of the models is still at a low level (basi-
cally the same as that without regularization). Along with
the observation that norm-regularization methods proposed
by other authors only slightly improve robustness of neural
network (as we have discussed in the Introduction), we be-
lieve that regularization of norms is ineffective in improving
adversarial robustness.
C.4. Comparison of Norms of Individual Layers
In the main text, we plot the distribution of the norms of
the plain models and adversarially robust models. Here, we
compare the norms of the corresponding layers in a model
trained with 4 methods, namely, plain (no regularization),
ALP, TRADES, PGD-AT. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 (please note that in all the plots,
the four bars represent the norms of the plain model, the
models trained with ALP, TRADES, and PGD-AT, respec-
tively). The comparison clearly shows that the norms of
adversarially robust CNNs are comparable to those of the
non-adversarially robust CNNs (plain). Moreover, in Reg-
Net (Figure 9) and SENet (Figure 12), the adversarially
robust CNNs even have much larger norms than the non-
adversarially robust ones. These results consistently show
that large norms do not hurt adversarially robustness.
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plain weight decay singular value clipping `1 norm decay `∞ norm decay
model ACC — 10−1 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 10−1 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−1 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5
vgg Clean 90.4 52.9 91.6 91.7 90.1 90.2 85.9 87.6 89.1 90.0 89.9 77.0 88.1 91.1 90.6 90.8 86.3 91.8 91.1 90.8 90.6Robust 60.2 17.3 56.3 60.5 60.6 60.3 55.1 48.8 52.2 54.1 56.7 55.8 56.5 62.5 61.1 60.1 47.7 56.9 60.0 60.8 60.1
resnet Clean 93.2 53.4 94.3 94.1 93.1 92.7 91.9 93.6 94.0 94.2 93.8 84.2 92.5 93.4 93.5 93.4 85.9 93.0 93.8 93.1 93.0Robust 37.0 14.5 28.2 33.7 33.9 40.9 44.1 35.2 41.7 43.2 39.8 35.9 24.5 37.7 38.3 37.5 25.8 20.0 34.7 38.9 37.6
senet Clean 93.1 10.0 94.2 93.9 93.0 92.4 90.4 93.8 94.2 93.8 94.2 78.0 92.3 93.8 93.3 93.3 86.9 93.0 93.6 92.8 93.2Robust 35.7 10.0 23.5 32.8 37.0 34.8 31.6 30.5 35.6 35.2 37.4 42.3 33.6 36.0 38.2 36.7 36.8 28.6 31.0 37.6 37.4
regnet Clean 91.8 18.8 93.6 94.4 92.3 91.3 91.8 93.9 93.4 93.0 92.4 88.2 93.7 92.3 91.6 91.9 87.9 93.4 92.0 91.8 91.9Robust 34.8 15.0 23.7 30.3 30.0 31.0 28.5 27.7 28.8 29.0 28.8 15.6 29.2 31.1 28.1 34.3 15.6 23.2 27.7 27.9 30.6
Table 2: Comparison of clean accuracy (%) and robust accuracy (%) of 4 CNN models trained with different norm-
regularization methods on CIFAR-10. The second row corresponds to the values of regularization parameters. Robust
accuracy is evaluated with standard Auto Attack (Croce & Hein, 2020) under `∞ metric at  = 1/255.
kernel size `2(VS) `2(SGL) `1(ours) `∞(ours)
3, 3, 32, 32 26.5 5.75 0.00605 0.00576
3, 3, 32, 128 27.4 6.92 0.00682 0.00575
3, 3, 128, 256 29.0 98.0 0.00576 0.00560
3, 3, 256, 512 59.4 490 0.0117 0.00898
5, 5, 256, 128 59.7 91.5 0.0103 0.00729
5, 5, 512, 256 255 523 0.0239 0.0180
Table 3: Computation time (seconds) of 100 runs of computing different norms for various kernels. The experimental setup
is the same as other experiments and the computation is run on GPU. The input image has the same shape as a CIFAR-10
image. The kernel size is represented by (kernel height, kernel width, # input channels, # output channels). VS denotes the
method of Virmaux & Scaman (2018) and SGL denotes the method of Sedghi et al. (2019).
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(a) Plain
(b) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−5 (c) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−4 (d) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−3 (e) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−2
(f) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−1 (g) Singular Value Clipping: 2.0 (h) Singular Value Clipping: 1.5 (i) Singular Value Clipping: 1.0
(j) Singular Value Clipping: 0.5 (k) Singular Value Clipping: 0.1 (l) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−5 (m) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−4
(n) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−3 (o) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−2 (p) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−1 (q) Weight Decay: 10−5
(r) Weight Decay: 10−4 (s) Weight Decay: 10−3 (t) Weight Decay: 10−2 (u) Weight Decay: 10−1
Figure 5: The `1 norms (or `∞ norms in `∞ norm decay) of the convolutional and fully connected layers in ResNet trained
with/without regularization.
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(a) Plain
(b) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−5 (c) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−4 (d) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−3 (e) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−2
(f) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−1 (g) Singular Value Clipping: 2.0 (h) Singular Value Clipping: 1.5 (i) Singular Value Clipping: 1.0
(j) Singular Value Clipping: 0.5 (k) Singular Value Clipping: 0.1 (l) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−5 (m) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−4
(n) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−3 (o) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−2 (p) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−1 (q) Weight Decay: 10−5
(r) Weight Decay: 10−4 (s) Weight Decay: 10−3 (t) Weight Decay: 10−2 (u) Weight Decay: 10−1
Figure 6: The `1 norms (also `∞ norms) of batch normalization layers in ResNet trained with/without regularization.
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plain `1 norm decay and projecting BN `∞ norm decay and projecting BN
model ACC — 10−1 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5 10−1 10−2 10−3 10−4 10−5
vgg Clean 90.4 10.0 85.8 90.7 90.7 90.4 19.9 91.9 91.4 90.5 90.5Robust 60.2 9.8 43.5 60.7 64.9 62.1 16.5 57.3 62.4 61.4 61.8
resnet Clean 93.2 10.0 10.4 93.9 93.1 93.2 10.0 92.7 94.0 93.0 93.3Robust 37.0 9.8 9.6 35.9 37.9 38.0 10.0 27.8 34.3 39.6 36.5
senet Clean 93.1 10.0 85.0 93.8 93.5 93.5 15.7 80.4 93.8 93.3 93.2Robust 35.7 8.3 18.9 29.7 34.1 33.4 15.1 17.8 26.5 32.6 33.7
regnet Clean 91.8 73.1 93.3 92.5 91.9 91.8 49.8 93.5 92.2 92.2 91.7Robust 34.8 16.1 27.6 32.4 33.4 31.5 15.3 16.8 29.2 31.2 31.1
Table 4: Comparison of clean accuracy (%) and robust accuracy (%) of 4 CNN models trained with `1 and `∞ norm decay
(and projecting BN norms to 5) on CIFAR-10. The second row corresponds to the values of the regularization parameter β.
Robust accuracy is evaluated with standard Auto Attack (Croce & Hein, 2020) under `∞ metric at  = 1/255.
(a) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−5 (b) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−4 (c) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−3 (d) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−2
(e) `1 Norm Decay: β = 10−1 (f) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−5 (g) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−4 (h) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−3
(i) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−2 (j) `∞ Norm Decay: β = 10−1
Figure 7: The `1 norms (or `∞ norms in `∞ norm decay) of convolutional, fully connected, and batch normalization layers
in ResNet trained with `1 and `∞ norm decay (and projecting all BN norms to 5) on CIFAR-10.
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Figure 8: Norm Comparison in VGG Layers
Figure 9: Norm Comparison in RegNet Convolutional and Fully Connected Layers
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Figure 10: Norm Comparison in RegNet Batch Normalization Layers
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Figure 11: Norm Comparison in ResNet Layers
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Figure 12: Norm Comparison in SENet Layers
